“The map is not the territory.” We quote this constantly in strategy meetings, usually without considering what kind of territory we are dealing with - or whether assuming that it is fixed is already part of the problem.

The phrase assumes a stable, pre-existing reality that exists independently of our attempt to represent it, and which a sufficiently skilled cartographer could eventually chart more accurately. This way of thinking can be useful in clear or complicated situations, but it becomes unreliable when the situation is complex.

In the complicated domain, cause and effect are stable but not always obvious. Analysis and relevant expertise can uncover them, so a more accurate map is possible. Here, the warning not to confuse the representation with the thing itself makes sense.

In genuinely complex situations, there may be no territory sitting there waiting to be surveyed. Cause and effect become coherent only in retrospect - Dave Snowden uses the term “retrospective coherence” - and the pattern may not exist before you engage with the system. It may take shape afterwards, through the actions you take and what they reveal.

The act of probing also changes the system, so the “territory” you are trying to map is partly shaped by that attempt. The cartographer is not outside the landscape, observing it from a distance. In a complex situation, we cannot reliably predict how the system will respond to a particular intervention. Cynefin therefore recommends several small probes whose failure can be contained, rather than committing to one large solution. We observe what each probe produces, support patterns moving in a useful direction and stop or limit those that are not.

This is why Snowden describes Cynefin as a framework for sense-making rather than categorisation. In a categorisation framework, you define the boxes first and then assign phenomena to them. In a sense-making framework, you observe the properties of the situation and allow the assignment to emerge.

A map is a categorisation artefact: you draw it first and use it afterwards. Complex work often calls for a different sequence - probe, sense and respond - rather than map, analyse and respond. Trying to map the situation first means treating a complex problem as if it were merely complicated and waiting to be deciphered. This is a common error in strategy.

So when someone says, “Before we act, let’s get more data and build a clearer picture,” ask whether that clearer picture can actually be obtained in advance, or whether it can only be assembled by looking back at what a small action has revealed.

If the picture can only emerge afterwards, further analysis may simply postpone the learning that comes from acting.